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Abstract 
 
 
 
In this paper, we examine the impact of mergers among German savings banks on the extent 
to which these savings banks engage in small business lending. The ongoing consolidation in 
the banking industry has sparked concerns about the continuous availability of credit to small 
businesses which has been further fueled by empirical studies that partly confirm a reduction 
in small business lending in the aftermath of mergers. However, using a proprietary data set 
of German savings banks we find strong evidence that in Germany merging savings banks do 
not significantly change the extent to which they lend to small businesses compared to prior 
to the merger or compared to the contemporaneous lending by non-merging banks. We 
investigate the merger related effects on small business lending in Germany from a bank-level 
perspective. Furthermore, we estimate small business lending and its continuous adjustment 
process simultaneously using recent General Method of Moments (GMM) techniques for 
panel data as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). 
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1.  Introduction 
The substantial reduction in the number of small banks in line with the ongoing consolidation 
in the banking industry has sparked concerns about the credit availability to small businesses. 
A  number  of  empirical  studies  have  further  fueled  these  concerns  by  finding  that  bank 
mergers may under certain circumstances indeed reduce the  availability of bank  credit to 
small businesses (e.g. Berger et al. (1995), Keeton (1995, 1996), Berger and Udell (1996), 
Peek  and  Rosengren  (1996,  1998)).  Small  banks  typically  specialize  in  lending  to  small 
businesses and are also found to have advantages in overcoming problems of asymmetric 
information accompanied with lending to small, often informationally opaque firms compared 
to large banks. Hence, if consolidation leads to a decline in the number of small banks or a 
change of the extent to which small banks engage in small business lending small businesses 
may find it difficult to satisfy their financing needs, especially in the absence of access to 
capital markets. 
In this regard we investigate the impact of bank mergers on small business lending for the 
German case. An analysis of the consequences of bank mergers in Germany is particularly 
relevant for a number of reasons: First, small and medium sized businesses in Germany, the 
so-called Mittelstand, have a stronger macroeconomic weight than in most other countries as 
they account for 99.7% of German businesses, employ  approximately  70% of Germany’s 
workforce  and  generate  almost  50%  of  GDP.3  Second,  the  German  Mittelstand  almost 
exclusively  relies  on  bank  loans  which  can  be  attributed  to  firm  size  and  the  lack  of 
informational  transparency  but  also  to  the  bank-based  structure  of  the  German  financial 
system (Schmidt and Tyrell (2004)). Finally, no other country in the European Union has 
experienced such a sharp decline in the number of banks – the number of banks in Germany 
has fallen by over 50% from 4,719 in 1990 to 2,300 in 2006.4 
While the effects of bank mergers on the availability of credit to small businesses has been 
extensively  studied  for  the  US  this  subject  has  received  only  limited  attention  for  other 
markets,  probably  mainly  due  to  data  constraints.  We  are  the  first  to  investigate  merger 
related effects on small business lending from a bank-level perspective in Germany. For the 
purposes  of  this  study  we  are  able  to  draw  on  a  unique  proprietary  panel  data  set  made 
                                                       
3   Source: Institut für Mittelstandsforschung Bonn. 
4   Source: Deutsche Bundesbank.   3 
available  by  the  German  Savings  Banks  Association  containing  detailed  financial  and 
operating statistics of all 457 German savings banks that existed at the end of 2006 as well as 
information on all mergers among savings banks that took place between 1994 and 2006. 
Compared to other available data sources for bank financials this data set is superior in terms 
of the completeness and the level of detail, especially with regards to the detailed breakdown 
of each bank’s lending activities otherwise not available in statutory accounts. Besides the 
uniqueness of our data we contribute to the existing empirical research by being the first in 
this context to specify a dynamic framework that simultaneously estimates the extent to which 
banks engage in small business lending and its adjustment behavior using recent General 
Method  of  Moments  (GMM)  techniques  developed  for  dynamic  panel  data  analyses  by 
Arellano and Bond (1991). 
We find strong evidence that banks involved in mergers do not reduce the extent to which 
they lend to small businesses post-merger compared with their respective lending prior to the 
merger or compared to the lending by those banks not involved in mergers at the same time. 
Thereby we observe the extent to which banks engage in small business lending using three 
measures,  namely  the  volume  of  small  business  loans  measured  in  absolute  terms,  as 
percentage of bank’s total assets and as percentage of bank’s total lending to non-banks. For 
all  three  measures  we  do  not  find  significant  changes  to  merging  banks’  small  business 
lending.  We  further  investigate  whether  merging  banks  reduce  the  funds  available  to  the 
smallest  of  the  small  business  borrowers,  mainly  craftsmen  and  small  trade,  but  find 
consistent  results  of  no  merger  related  effects  on  small  business  lending.  Generally,  our 
results are robust across different model specifications. 
Our findings imply that mergers among savings banks do not have an adverse effect on the 
availability  of  credit  to  small  businesses  in  Germany.  From  a  bank  perspective,  merging 
savings banks continue to lend to small businesses following mergers to the same extent as 
they did prior to the merger or as other non-merging banks do. These findings are in line with 
those of Marsch et al. (2007) who investigate merger related effects on the availability of 
credit for businesses from a firm perspective based on data from the German Central Bank’s 
Credit  Register.  In  the  only  other  study  for  the  German  market,  they  conclude  that  bank 
consolidation  in  Germany  does  not  have  a  significant  negative  impact  on  the  credit 
availability for small business borrowers. Their results are consistent across the three pillars   4 
of  the  German  banking  market,  i.e.  private  banks,  public  savings  banks  and  cooperative 
banks. 
The remaining paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines why small banks are better 
able to engage in small business lending and discusses how bank mergers may influence the 
extent to which small banks lend to small businesses. Section 3 summarizes the findings of 
previous empirical studies in this field. Section 4 introduces both our unique panel data set of 
German  savings  banks  as  well  as  our  dynamic  panel  model  specifications.  Section  5 
summarizes  the  empirical  results  and  highlights  the  robustness  of  our  findings.  Finally, 
section 6 concludes and discusses potential policy implications from our analysis. 
2.  Small business lending and how bank mergers may change banks’ propensity to 
lend to small businesses 
Small businesses almost entirely rely on banks as a primary source of funding. Since small 
firms tend to be informationally opaque for outside investors they are generally not able to 
access capital markets in the way large firms do. In order to overcome such problems of 
asymmetric  information  banks  develop  close  relationships  with  borrowers.  Thereby  they 
invest in obtaining borrower-specific, often proprietary, information through screening and 
monitoring  and  learn  about  the  credit  quality  of  the  borrower  by  means  of  multiple 
interactions over time (Boot (2000)). The nature of these bank-borrower lending relationships 
is a key feature of lending to small businesses as it reduces banks’ associated costs of issuing 
loans and provides small firms with access to bank funding.5  
Berger and Udell (1996) propose that lending to small businesses is distinctly different from 
lending  to  large  businesses.  While  small  business  lending  tends  to  rely  on  long-term 
relationships  and  an  intensive  exchange  of  proprietary  information  lending  to  large, 
informationally transparent borrowers is more generic in nature, transaction-driven and often 
involves more than one financial institution. Hence, lending to small and large firms requires 
two  different  sets  of  technology  in  terms  of  the  policies  and  procedures  associated  with 
screening, credit approvals and monitoring. 
                                                       
5   See Ongena and Smith (1998) and Boot (2000) for an extensive overview of theoretical and empirical evidence regarding 
relationship banking.   5 
Small banks in general may have an advantage in lending to small businesses compared to 
large banks. For example, small banks can leverage their close links to the local community to 
obtain additional information about the borrower and the condition of the local economic 
environment – an advantage large banks even with an extensive branch network may not be 
able to replicate due to centralized credit approval processes (Berger et al. (1998)). Stein 
(2002)  provides  formal  evidence  that  soft  information  –  a  key  feature  of  small  business 
lending – can be better dealt with by decentralized organizations (such as small banks) while 
large  organizations  act  better  upon  hard  transferable  information.  Furthermore,  senior 
management of small banks is able to monitor lending decisions and subsequent monitoring 
more closely enabling small banks to authorize non-standard, relationship loans more easily 
than large banks. The costs associated with managing  and monitoring these locally-based 
processes  may  be  too  high  for  large  banks  to  actively  engage  in  small  business  lending 
(Strahan and Weston (1998)). Large banks may also be exposed to diseconomies of scale 
associated with the simultaneous provision of multiple services in complex organizations (e.g. 
lending to both small and large businesses) as suggested by Williamson (1988). The ability of 
large  banks  to  better  diversify  credit  risks  across  borrowers  may  even  be  offset  by  these 
diseconomies (Strahan and Weston (1998)). Besides a superior access to credit information 
and a better organizational setup to facilitate effective monitoring Carter et al. (2004) argue 
that small banks that operate in less competitive markets also have a greater incentive to 
invest in loan relationships because there is less chance that the borrower will switch to a 
competing lender. A number of empirical studies show that small banks are  able to earn 
higher (risk-adjusted) returns on small business loans than large banks and therefore suggest 
that small banks indeed have a competitive advantage in small business lending (e.g. Berger 
and Udell (1996), Sapienza (2002), Carter et al. (2004)). Furthermore, consistent with other 
evidence that small banks are better able to engage in small business lending Berger et al. 
(2005)  find  that  large  banks  lend  at  a  greater  distance,  interact  with  borrowers  more 
impersonally, have shorter and less exclusive borrowing relationships, and do not mitigate 
credit constraints as effectively as small banks do. Besides these competitive disadvantages 
large banks may also decide to abstain from small business lending because they have more 
extensive alternative lending opportunities. For example, large banks have the ability to invest 
in lending to large borrowers as they are not as restricted by regulatory lending limits as small 
banks are. Also, large banks do not rely on small borrowers to achieve a desired level and 
composition of commercial lending while small banks can only spread their risks sufficiently   6 
by making a larger number of small loans (Keeton (1996)). Lastly, large banks may be in a 
position to take advantage of other business opportunities not available to small banks (e.g. 
underwriting) and relocate funds away from small business lending. 
Empirical findings mostly support the notion that small banks actually engage more heavily in 
small business lending than large banks for above reasons and show that small banks allocate 
a larger share of their assets to small business loans than large banks (e.g. Walraven (1997), 
Peek  and  Rosengren  (1998),  Strahan  and  Weston  (1998)).6  Berger  and  Udell  (1996)  and 
Keeton (1996) find that also more organizationally complex banks provide less credit to small 
borrowers. However, Berger and Udell (1996) find at the same time that bank size is a much 
more predominant factor for the extent to which banks engage in small business lending than 
organizational complexity which, according to Sapienza (2002), is generally a function of 
size. 
In line with the majority of other researchers in this field (e.g. Walraven (1997), Peek and 
Rosengren (1998), Strahan and Weston (1998)) we expect the impact of bank mergers on the 
availability of credit to small businesses to be largely driven by the bank’s changes in lending 
focus in response to the increased size and a more complex organizational setup. Increasing 
size, especially in the course of M&A, may change a bank’s ability and/or willingness to 
engage in small business lending for the same reasons that large banks focus less on small 
business lending than small banks. For example, the enlarged organization may require more 
layers of management and centralized decision-making while eliminating the organizational 
structure  required  to  effectively  conducting  small  business  lending.  Also,  branch 
consolidation  may  compromise  the  bank’s  proximity  to  its  borrowers  and,  henceforth,  its 
ability to obtain private information about the customer and the local economic environment – 
the basis for relationship-driven small business lending.7 
Furthermore, a revision and refocusing of the bank’s lending policy in terms of risk appetite 
and target customers may also affect the extent to which the combined bank engages in small 
business lending. The assessment and restructuring of a bank’s loan portfolio in terms of 
                                                       
6   We do not confirm the notion that small banks engage more heavily in small business lending than large banks do 
because our data set comprises only of savings banks for which we assume that they solely engage in small business 
lending and not in lending to large borrowers. 
7   Amel et al. (2004) suggest that mergers may also induce shifts in market power and therefore cause adverse price effects 
for certain products, most likely for deposits and loans to small businesses. Although, the analysis of merger related 
effects on prices poses an interesting subject for further research it is not subject of this study.   7 
borrower  quality  and  diversification  is  central  to  bank  mergers.  This  may  involve  the 
modification of the terms and conditions on existing loan contracts or even the termination of 
selected relationships if the bank does not have a comparative advantage in making certain 
types  of  loans  any  more.  According  to  Berger  et  al.  (1998),  post-merger  organizational 
changes may also aim at improving the value maximizing behavior and economic efficiency 
in terms of improving corporate governance and eliminating loans that the bank has entered 
into under non-value maximizing choices. Furthermore, the merger motives will clearly affect 
the bank’s decision to which extent it will continue to lend to small businesses in the future. 
For  example,  if  the  acquiring  bank  aims  at  decreasing  funding  costs  by  accessing  more 
deposits, higher market shares in particular segments, improved geographic diversification 
and coverage, special knowledge including private information from lending relationships, 
they may not expand or even limit the extent to which it engages in small business lending 
(Keeton (1996), Peek and Rosengren (1998)). 
Although most of the potential consequences of bank mergers addressed above imply that 
bank mergers negatively impact the credit availability to small businesses they do not yet 
account for the reaction of other market participants, both banks and non-banks, that may be 
able to mitigate or even offset the negative merger related effects by picking up any small 
business lending business dropped by merging banks. In the following we will provide an 
overview of findings of previous empirical research and then investigate the consequences of 
bank mergers on small business lending for the German market. 
3.  Review of empirical literature on the effects of bank mergers on small business 
lending 
The effect of bank mergers on the availability of credit to small and medium sized businesses 
has attracted a growing attention by researchers since the mid-1990s. However, while most 
authors find that small banks invest a higher share of their assets in small business loans than 
large banks (e.g. Berger and Udell (1996), Walraven (1997), Peek and Rosengren (1998), 
Strahan and Weston (1998)), studies on the impact of bank mergers on small business lending 
provide mixed results. Previous empirical results appear to depend on the type of M&A, the 
sizes  of  the  participating  banks,  the  pre-merger  small  business  lending  propensity  of  the 
acquiring bank, the econometric methodology and the time horizon observed following the 
transaction. Furthermore, the results seem to be also driven by the point of view taken by the   8 
respective study and, in particular, whether the analysis accounts for the reaction of other 
market participants to potential shifts in credit supply due to bank consolidation. Depending 
on the data used we distinguish below between the bank-level view with analyses based on 
banks’ balance sheet data, the firm-level view with analyses using firms’ balance sheet data 
and the market-level view based on loan contract data across banks. 
The majority of existing empirical research on the impact of bank M&A on small business 
lending has focused on the US market using bank-level balance sheet data and a breakdown of 
each bank’s lending activities from the June version of the FDIC’s Reports of Condition and 
Income  (June  Call  Reports).8  Using  June  Call  Report  data  Walraven  (1997),  Peek  and 
Rosengren (1998) and Strahan and Weston (1998) find in contrast to the widespread concern 
that mergers among banks reduce the credit availability to small businesses that bank mergers 
may even increase the availability of small business credit. Although they confirm that the 
bank’s small business lending activities relative to the bank’s total assets decrease with bank 
size9 they highlight that, first, most bank mergers are conducted among small banks because 
large banks typically do not acquire small banks that heavily engage in small business lending 
and, second, that merging banks tend to exhibit a larger share of small business lending than 
non-merging banks comparable in size. In particular, Strahan and Weston (1998) compare 
pre-merger small business lending shares of the pro-forma consolidated banks’ total assets 
with  the  respective  post-merger  shares  of  the  consolidated  institution  and  find  that  the 
availability of small business credit from merging banks increases in the aftermath of small 
bank mergers. For mergers or acquisitions of larger banks the authors do not find evidence for 
significant  changes  in  small  business  lending.  Walraven  (1997)  and  Peek  and  Rosengren 
(1998) investigate the impact of the extent to which banks participating in mergers engage in 
small business lending before the merger and find that the post-merger small business lending 
share converges quickly towards the pre-merger small business lending share of the acquirer. 
Because they also find that, on average, acquiring banks allocate a larger share of their assets 
to small business lending than their targets their empirical results suggest that in a merger 
context small business lending does not decrease but may even increase post-merger.  
                                                       
8   June Call Reports include all US commercial and state-chartered banks that are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC). June Call Reports are available since June 1993 on an annual basis. 
9   Strahan and Weston (1998) also highlight that while the share of small business loans of total assets decreases with bank 
size the absolute volume of small business lending increases monotonically with bank size.   9 
In the probably most extensive bank-level study Berger et al. (1998) analyze the effects of 
bank  mergers  on  small  business  lending  by  decomposing  the  net  impact  into  static  and 
dynamic effects as well as the effect of mergers on small business lending by other banks in 
the same local market. Specifically, the authors measure the following four effects: First, the 
static effect presents the difference between the small business lending share of total lending 
of the pro-forma consolidated bank and the small business lending share of total lending of 
the acquiring bank. Second, the restructuring effect accounts for post-merger restructuring 
related changes of bank’s size, bank’s financial characteristics and local market competitive 
position. Third, the direct effect describes the consolidated bank’s change in lending focus 
beyond any changes that can be associated to either the static or the restructuring effect. The 
direct  effect  is  thereby  measured  as  the  difference  in  lending  between  the  restructured 
institution and comparable banks that have not been involved in M&A. Last, the external 
effect captures the changes in local competitors’ lending activity in response to bank mergers. 
Using a sample of more than 6,000 bank mergers in the period from 1980 to 1995 Berger et 
al.  (1998)  find  that  the  static  effect  significantly  reduces  merging  banks’  small  business 
lending, i.e. the pro-forma consolidated entity exhibits a lower share of total lending that is 
dedicated to small business lending than the acquiring bank. However, this static effect is 
largely offset by the dynamic effects. Furthermore, other banks in the same local market pick 
up small business loan volumes dropped by the merging banks, a finding also confirmed by 
firm-level and market-level studies (e.g. Craig and Hardee (2007), Bonaccorsi di Patti and 
Gobbi  (2007),  Avery  and  Samolyk  (2003)).  This  positive  external  effect  can  possibly  be 
explained by de novo banks that tend to lend more to small businesses as a percentage of total 
assets  than  other  small  banks  comparable  in  size  (Goldberg  and  White  (1998),  DeYoung 
(1998), DeYoung et al. (1999)). Finally, Berger et al. (1998) verify, at least for the case of 
bank mergers (not for bank acquisitions), that if static, dynamic and external effects are taken 
into account small and medium sized bank mergers are linked with increases in small business 
lending, while larger bank mergers are  generally  still associated with a decrease in small 
business lending. 
Taking a firm-level view Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi (2007) find that firms that borrow 
from banks involved in M&A as an acquirer or as a target experience a temporary reduction 
in credit (but not credit lines) of approximately 1.5% and 2.0%, respectively. The negative 
shock is absorbed after 3 years in line with findings by Berger et al. (1998). Craig and Hardee 
(2007)  find  that  other  market  participants  partially,  although  not  fully,  offset  the  merger   10 
related contraction in small business credit availability. Sapienza (2002) finds evidence that 
small business borrowers of merging banks are less likely to borrow from the consolidated 
entity  in  the  future  than  borrowers  of  banks  not  involved  in  M&A.  Furthermore,  while 
controlling for other observable characteristics of the borrower he confirms that large banks 
that acquire small banks tend to reduce their post-merger small business lending exposure 
more than other banks. Degryse et al. (2005) use information from individual loan contracts 
in  Belgium  and  partly  confirm  results  by  Sapienza  (2002).  They  find  that  lending 
relationships are more likely to be terminated for borrowers of target banks. However, they 
also  show  that  relationship  termination  is  less  likely  for  merging  banks’  borrowers,  in 
particular for those who borrow from both banks involved, compared to borrowers from non-
merging banks. In the only study on the impact of bank mergers on the credit availability for 
small businesses in Germany Marsch et al. (2007) also verify a temporary negative shock to 
small business lending which is quickly absorbed in the years following the merger. Using a 
dataset combining credit register and balance sheet data of both German firms and banks 
Marsch  et  al.  (2007)  further  investigate  the  relationship  between  bank  size  and  firm 
indebtness, which they find statistically but not economically significant. The authors show 
further that merger related changes in market concentration do not (negatively) affect the 
supply of small business credit. Their  results are consistent across all three pillars of the 
German banking market, i.e. they hold for private, public savings and cooperative banks. 
Finally,  market-level  studies  broadly  confirm  firm-level  findings:  Bonaccorsi  di  Patti  and 
Gobbi (2001) investigate the impact of mergers and market entry of banks on the volume and 
the quality of credit at the local market level using data constructed from the Italian Central 
Credit  Register.  The  authors  find  that  mergers  result  in  a  temporary  reduction  in  small 
business lending and in an increase in bad loans. However, they do not find evidence for a 
permanent reduction in small business lending due to changes in bank size. Because they 
observe the market-level they do not infer any conclusions about the behaviour of individual 
banks involved in M&A and those market-participants not involved in M&A. Avery  and 
Samolyk (2003) find that mergers of large banks lead to lower small business loan growth in 
the respective market while mergers of small banks do increase small business loan growth. 
Generally, small (community) banks mitigate the negative effects of consolidation.   11 
4.  Empirical specifications 
Description of data set 
Our analyses are based on a proprietary data sample provided by the German Savings Banks 
Association comprising detailed financials and operating statistics of German public savings 
banks for the period from 1996 until 2006. At the end of 2006 there were 457 savings banks 
in  Germany  for  all  of  which  annual  records  for  each  year  of  the  observation  period  are 
included in the sample. For each bank and year we have added data on the local economic 
environment  as  well  as  the  local  market  concentration.  The  data  set  is  unique  because  it 
includes all savings banks active in Germany. In comparison, BvD’s BankScope only covers 
approximately 80% of the savings banks in terms of total assets and number. Also, contrary to 
general accounting practice balance sheet data in our data set is based on arithmetic averages 
of monthly balance sheets. This poses a more realistic picture of the actual balances of the 
different asset and liability accounts throughout the respective year. Furthermore, our sample 
contains a breakdown of total loans to customers by retail, small business, craftsmen and trade 
(smallest businesses, “Handwerk”), public and foreign customers. A complete list of mergers 
and acquisitions among savings banks not all of which are publicly available complements 
our data set. 
For several reasons savings banks in Germany pose a very interesting subject for economic 
research. First, besides the cooperative banks savings banks have been responsible for the 
majority of mergers and acquisitions among banks in Germany, accounting for almost 150 
mergers between 1996 and 2006 while reducing the number of savings banks from more than 
620 at the beginning of 1996 to less than 460 at the end of 2006 (see Panel A in Table 4). 
Second, together with cooperative banks savings banks are still the dominant provider of 
credit  and  banking  services  to  individuals  and  small  and  medium  sized  enterprises  in 
Germany, accounting for approximately 40% of assets in the banking system. Third, savings 
banks follow what is known as the “Regionalprinzip” (regional principle), i.e. each institution 
exclusively  (for  the  savings  banks  sector)  serves  a  well  defined  and  separated  regional 
business area that often corresponds to one of the 440 administrative districts in Germany. 
This allows us to account for the local rather than the national market concentration and 
economic environment. Moreover, due to the regional principle consolidation among savings 
banks does not induce changes in market power and, hence, should not induce changes to the 
behavior of non-merging banks in the same local market. This is argued to be one of the   12 
problems of studies using sample groups of merging and non-merging banks operating in the 
same region (see Amel et al. (2004)). Fourth, all banks operate based on the same business 
model and an almost identical product offering. Fifth, all banks use the same accounting and 
reporting principles and almost all operate on the basis of the same legal foundation. Finally, 
all savings banks are independent institutions with their own business strategy and operational 
setup. As a result, these banks form a large group of highly comparable but independent 
entities – an ideal setup to analyze the implications of mergers as well as different bank and 
market characteristics with econometric models. 
Financials  are  available  on  a  pro  forma  adjusted  basis  that  accounts  for  mergers  and 
acquisitions.  Thereby  financials  of  acquiring  and  acquired  banks  have  been  pro  forma 
consolidated over the whole observation period as if the merging banks have always operated 
as one entity. Hence, contrary to general accounting practice financials have not only been 
consolidated  in  the  period  following  a  merger  but  also  in  the  years  prior  to  the  actual 
transaction.10 11 Although the backwards aggregation of the financials of all banks involved in 
mergers within the observation period eases the comparability of the pre- and post-merger 
performance and small business lending share of the combined bank, it does not allow for 
observing  the  characteristics  of  the  banks  participating  in  a  merger  separately  before  the 
merger. In order to overcome this shortcoming of our data set and at least to distinguish 
between merger types  we append  additional financial data such as total assets, total loan 
volumes  and  total  deposit  volumes  for  acquirers  and  targets  in  the  pre-merger  year. 
Nevertheless, because the additional data is derived from savings banks’ financial statements 
it does not provide any breakdown on banks’ lending activities except for their total lending 
exposure. 
The information on mergers among savings banks comprises details on the timing and the 
parties involved for each transaction. The data set contains 147 mergers for which financials 
for an average post-merger time of 4.7 years are available. 
                                                       
10  Elsas (2004) points out that the approach of consolidation of balance sheet data by backwards aggregation dilutes merger 
related effects in case of subsequent mergers because financials of banks absorbed by subsequent mergers are included in 
consolidated financials already at the time of the first merger. In line with Elsas (2004) we argue that this problem is only 
relevant  for  a  small  sub-sample  of  our data;  in  our  sample  only  24  banks  are  repeatedly  involved  in  mergers.  Our 
robustness tests show that results remain unaffected even when excluding banks involved in multiple transactions. 
11  Berger and Humphrey (1992), Linder and Crane (1992), Rhoades (1993) and Elsas (2004) use a similar approach in their 
post-merger operating performance studies while Strahan and Weston (1998) use a similar approach in their analysis on 
the impact of bank mergers on small business lending.   13 
Economic data was provided by the German Statistical State Offices. Information on market 
concentration is based on regional bank branch statistics provided by the German Central 
Bank. The economic data and the concentration measures are reported on the level of the 
respective  administrative  districts  (“Landkreise”  and  “kreisfreie  Städte”)  the  bank  is 
headquartered  in.  Germany  comprises  of  440  such  administrative  districts.  Thomson 
Financial’s Datastream is used to obtain interest rate data. 
Descriptive  statistics  of  the  data  applied  in  our  empirical  analysis  are  provided  below 
following the introduction of the empirical model and variables. 
Empirical model and variables 
This paper focuses on analyzing the impact of bank mergers on the extent to which banks lend 
to small borrowers. Following the extensive summary of the different findings of previous 
research  we  design  an  empirical  model  to  evaluate  the  consequences  of  mergers  among 
German savings banks on their provision of loans to small businesses in Germany. Thereby 
we regress different measures of banks’ small business lending (SBL) as dependent variable 
on  a  set  of  explanatory  variables  that  account  for  merger  events  (M&A),  bank  specific 
characteristics (BS) as well as the local market (LM) and the capital markets environment 
(CM). As suggested by Wooldridge (2002) and Arellano and Bond (1991) we also include 
dummy variables for each year in the observation period to account for any secular changes 
that are not being modeled (u). The constant term is represented by c. 
The general form of the models we propose is as follows: 
t i t i m m t i l l t i k k i j t i j t t i ε CM LM BS M&A β SBL υ c SBL , , , , , , , , , , + + + + + + + = ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ - b b b b t t
 
In order to account for the fact that merger related effects on banks’ small business lending 
are not realized instantaneously but over time we conduct a dynamic analysis and therefore 
include lags of the dependent variable (see Elsas (2004)).12 Adjustments to shocks to lending 
can  generally  only  materialize  over  time  due  to  the  medium  to  long-term  nature  of  debt 
contracts, and changes to a bank’s credit and credit risk policy may take a number of years to 
come into effect (Marsch et al. (2007)). 
                                                       
12  We  include  more  than  one  lag  of  the  dependent  variable  for  technical  reasons  to  ensure  the  validity  of  our  model 
specification as laid out in our discussion of empirical results.   14 
We use three measures of small business lending as dependent variables in order to evaluate 
whether potential effects on small business lending originate from changes to the bank as a 
whole, the lending business as a whole or the small business lending in particular. First, we 
employ the natural logarithm of the absolute level of bank’s small business lending (Ln(Small 
Business  Lending)),  similar  to  Strahan  and  Weston  (1998)  for  bank-level  analyses  and 
Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi (2007) and Marsch et al. (2007) who observe the effect of bank 
mergers on the absolute level of firms’ bank liabilities. Second, we measure small business 
lending as a percentage share of bank’s total assets (Small Business Lending as % of Total 
Assets) in line with the majority of studies in this field (e.g. Walraven (1997), Strahan and 
Weston (1998), DeYoung et al. (1999), Focarelli et al. (2002)). Third, we measure small 
business lending as percentage share of bank’s total lending to non-banks (Small Business 
Lending as % of Total Lending to Non-banks) to account for any post-merger shifts within the 
bank’s lending portfolio. 
While most papers define small business loans as non-residential, non-farm commercial and 
industrial loans with an original nominal amount of less than USD 1 million (e.g. Walraven 
(1997), Berger et al. (1998), Strahan and Weston (1998)), we take an approach similar to the 
one used by Keeton (1996) who only considers those banks for his analyses that focus on 
small business lending and typically cannot provide large loans (or loans to large borrowers) 
due  to  regulatory  lending  limits  and  problems  of  diversification.  German  savings  banks 
operate in a defined local market and specifically aim at providing credit to local small and 
medium  sized  companies.  Regulatory  lending  limits  are  equally  responsible  for  savings 
banks’ focus on small rather than large business loans. Hence, we assume that all of savings 
banks’  business  lending  relates  to  small  business  lending  which  is  also  confirmed  by  an 
average  business  loan  size  of  approximately  EUR  100,000  as  shown  in  our  descriptive 
statistics in Panel B of Table 2. Our approach of taking all loans into account without further 
differentiating  between  different  loan  size  classes  also  does  not  suffer  from  loans  being 
classified  as  non-small  business  loans  as  customers  grow  (see  DeYoung  et  al.  (1999)). 
Nevertheless, in order to highlight the robustness of our findings we investigate the merger 
impact on lending to the smallest of the small business borrowers, mainly craftsmen and trade 
(“Handwerk”), thereby applying the same measures for small business lending as introduced 
above.   15 
Our key explanatory variables are dummy variables that indicate when a bank was involved in 
a merger (M&A), i.e. it takes the value 1 if the respective bank was involved in a merger or an 
acquisition in the respective year.13 First of all, we include one M&A dummy variable that 
indicates whether the respective bank was involved in a merger in the current year (t = t). In 
order to account for the fact that adjustments to small business lending due to mergers are 
only  realized  over  time  we  also  include  lagged  values  of  the  M&A  dummy  variable. 
Specifically, we include one dummy variable that reflects whether a merger took place in any 
of the four years before the year of the respective observation (t = t - 1; t = t - 2; t = t - 3; t = 
t - 4) and one for merger involvement in any year before that (t < t - 4). The lag structure of 
M&A dummy variables varies across empirical studies, however, it generally goes in line with 
the authors’ expectations of the time required for changes to small business lending to fully 
materialize. For example, Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi (2007) find that the merger related 
shock  to  the  availability  of  credit  to  small  businesses  is  absorbed  after  three  years  while 
Strahan and Weston (1998) and Marsch et al. (2007) only test for effects in the merger year 
and the first two subsequent years, partly due to the paucity of a longer time frame in their 
data. Focarelli et al. (2002) and Elsas (2004) propose an alternative lag structure for M&A 
dummy variables. They distinguish between short-term effects (t = t), medium-term effects (t 
 Î [t – 1; t – 3]) and long-term effects (t = t  £ - 4). In robustness tests we also apply their lag 
structure but arrive at consistent results. Based on the design of our M&A dummy variables 
the  reference  group  for  the  observations  of  merging  banks  comprises  implicitly  all 
observations of banks that have not been involved in mergers throughout the observation 
period and observations of pre-merger years of merging banks. The control group does not 
include any observations of banks that have been involved in mergers in any previous year of 
the observation period. This is in line with Calomiris (1999) who suggests that the inclusion 
of observations of post-merger years into the control group limits the time horizon of merger 
adjustments and can lead to substantial underestimation of the merger related effects.14 
                                                       
13  Multiple transactions in any one year or single transactions with multiple parties involved are treated as one transaction 
since annual data is used for the evaluation of post-merger effects on lending (see Linder and Crane (1992) for analyses 
on banks’ post-merger performance and Peek and Rosengren (1998) for analyses of the impact of bank mergers on small 
business  lending).  Furthermore,  we  do  not  distinguish  between  mergers  and  acquisitions  because  economically  all 
transactions among savings banks are mergers. Hence, the expressions “merger” and “M&A” are used interchangeably. 
14  Also see Calomiris (1999) for a detailed discussion of the construction of counterfactuals in post-merger performance 
analyses.   16 
In  order  to  control  for  other  determinants  of  banks’  small  business  lending  we  include  a 
number of bank specific characteristics. First, we control for bank size by including total 
assets (Total Assets) and the square to total assets (Sq(Total Assets)) as Peek and Rosengren 
(1998),  Strahan  and  Weston  (1998)  and  DeYoung  (1998)  find  a  non-linear  relationship 
between  bank  size  and  small  business  lending  measured  as  percentage  of  total  assets.  In 
particular,  Strahan  and  Weston  (1998)  find  that  small  business  lending  measured  as  a 
percentage of total assets first rises and then falls with bank size. Thereby the authors argue 
that small banks are excluded from lending to large borrowers until they reach a critical size. 
Beyond this point banks engage more heavily in large business lending which simultaneously 
decreases the relative share of small business lending. DeYoung et al. (1999) suggest that 
small business lending will negatively affect lending to small borrowers if the bank has USD 
100 to USD 300 million in total assets. Focarelli et al. (2002) and Elsas (2004) also include 
total assets and the square of total assets to control for general bank heterogeneity. However, 
they do not control for any other bank specific characteristics as we do. Other than size we 
control  for  banks’  business  mix  and  product  focus  by  including  the  share  of  non-interest 
revenues  to  total  operating  revenues  (Non-Interest  Revenues/Operating  Revenues). 
Furthermore, we control for bank’s average business loan size (Average Loan Size) as a proxy 
for  borrower  size.  Furthermore,  we  control  for  the  riskiness  of  the  bank’s  overall  loan 
portfolio (Loan Loss Provisions/Total Lending) that may influence bank’s credit and credit 
risk policy especially if re-considered following a merger. Finally, we include the equity ratio 
(Equity/Total Assets) to account for the capitalization of the respective bank that determines a 
bank’s ability to grow its lending business. 
In line with Berger et al. (1999) we consider market concentration on a local bank market 
level (Local HHI).15 We control for market power but do not assume major shifts in local 
market concentration from mergers in our sample as German savings banks by law operate in 
exclusive (for the savings banks sector), non-overlapping local markets. As data  for total 
assets, loan and deposit volumes is not available on an administrative district level for all 
(especially  private)  banking  groups,  we  determine  the  local  market  concentration  as  the 
Hirschman-Herfindahl-Index on the basis of individual banks’ market shares calculated as the 
number  of  own  branches  in  each  administrative  district  over  the  total  number  of  bank 
                                                       
15  US studies focus on local bank  markets  analogous to US policy guidelines  for  merger  approval processes and also 
because research finds that both households and small businesses almost always choose banks that are present nearby (see 
Kwast et al. (1997) and Kwast (1999)).   17 
branches  in  the  respective  district  (see  Fischer  and  Hempell  (2006)).  Savings  banks  in 
Germany hold a dominant market position in higher concentrated, typically rural, local bank 
markets. In rural areas savings banks and cooperative banks are often the only banks present 
while private banks maintain branch networks only in urban or more densely populated areas. 
We also implicitly control for the local demand for credit as determinant of bank’s lending 
volume by including the bank’s average interest received (price) on its business loans adjusted 
for risk and current interest rate level (Local Loan Interest Rate). In order to control for the 
local  economic  environment  and  because  demand  for  credit  is  driven  by  local  economic 
prospects we also include GDP per inhabitant (Local GDP per Inhabitant). 
In terms of the capital markets environment we control for the bank’s ability to benefit from 
term transformation (i.e. funding long-term loans with short-term deposits while maximizing 
the average interest spread) approximated by the Yield Curve Slope. 
Table 1 provides a summary overview of variables included in our analyses as well as their 
respective calculation. The following section provides a descriptive analysis of the variables 
employed in our analysis. 
Descriptive statistics 
Tables 2, 3 and 4 provide detailed descriptive statistics on the data employed in our empirical 
analysis. Panel A of Table 2 outlines the development of the overall German savings banks 
sector and of the average bank and market characteristics of the 457 savings banks in our 
sample on a year-by-year basis for our observation period from 1996 to 2006. Panel B of 
Table 2 provides similar statistics for the full sample across all years.16 Table 3 describes the 
lending activities of savings banks as well as the differences in the degree to which savings 
banks engage in small business lending across different size quartiles. Table 4 provides an 
overview of the merger activity of German savings banks during our observation period from 
1996 to 2006. 
During  the  observation  period  the  average  German  savings  bank  grew  from  EUR  1,768 
million in total assets at an average inflation-adjusted annual growth rate of 1.4% to EUR 
                                                       
16  Please note that descriptive statistics in Panel B of Table 2 are based on observations for the years 2001 to 2006. This is in 
analogy to our main regression analysis which only accounts for observations in these years because in our regression 
analysis four years of observations are lost due to the inclusion of four lags of the respective dependent variable and one 
further year of observations is lost due to first differencing.   18 
2,025 million in 2006.17 In terms of Total Assets and Small Business Lending the sector had 
steadily grown until 2002. Since then, the sector has declined by approximately 3% and 6%, 
respectively. This decline was mainly driven by the recession that followed the 2002 stock 
market crash and the increasing competition by foreign de novo banks in Germany. Small 
Business Lending declined faster than Total Assets as their share of total lending to non-banks 
(Small Business Lending as % of Total Lending to Non-banks) decreased over time while total 
loans  to  non-banks  as  percentage  of  total  assets  remained  fairly  constant  at  around  60%. 
Lending to the smallest of the small business borrowers (“Handwerk”) declined even faster 
than overall small business lending by an average of approximately 2.1% per year between 
1996 and 2006. While each savings bank on average held EUR 93 million (9.4% of lending to 
non-banks) of “Handwerk” loans in 1996, in 2006 they only held EUR 75 million (6.9% of 
lending to non-banks). Also the Average Loan Size declined over the observation period. The 
visible decline in small business lending, both in total and average volumes, gives support to 
concerns  of  a  potential  decrease  in  credit  availability  to  small  business  borrowers. 
Nevertheless, one needs to point out that the extent to which savings banks engage in small 
business lending differs significantly across banks as indicated by the 25% and 75% quantiles 
in Panel B of Table 2. 
One of the other key developments of bank specific characteristics is the increase of Non-
Interest Revenues/Operating Revenues from 15% in 1996 to 22% in 2006. Both, a relatively 
flat interest rate yield curve reducing net interest revenues as well as the increased importance 
of  non-interest  bearing  products  are  responsible  for  this  development.  Loan  Loss 
Provisions/Total Lending varies in magnitude according to the respective phase in the credit 
cycle. Especially the 2002 economic downturn was accompanied by an increasing number of 
delinquencies  and  write-offs  also  leading  to  higher  provisions  made  by  savings  banks. 
However, Loan Loss Provisions/Total Lending do not only vary across time but also across 
savings banks as indicated in Panel B, highlighting the heterogeneity of savings banks’ credit 
and credit risk policies. Finally, Equity/Total Assets increased from 4.0% to 5.0% during the 
observation as a sign of an improving capitalization at savings banks, principally enabling 
savings banks to grow their lending activities. Increases in equity have been achieved through 
the accumulation of retained earnings because only a few savings banks actually distribute 
earnings. 
                                                       
17  Absolute values in EUR are presented at 2000 prices in order to adjust for inflationary effects.   19 
The control variables employed to describe the local market environment do not exhibit any 
particular changes over time: The risk-adjusted Local Loan Interest Rate fluctuates between 
0.8% and 1.7% while the average Local GDP per Inhabitant increased in line with overall 
economic growth while maintaining significant differences across administrative regions as 
exhibited in Panel B of Table 2. The Yield Curve Slope as our relevant indicator for the 
general capital markets environment fluctuated throughout the observation period, however, it 
decreased towards the end of our observation period indicating a flat yield curve. 
Table 3 provides a breakdown of savings banks’ lending activities and indicates how the 
extent  to  which  savings  banks  engage  in  small  business  lending  differs  across  bank  size 
classes. On average, a savings bank’s total lending to non-banks amounts to approximately 
61% of bank’s total assets. The share of total lending to non-banks differs slightly across 
banks,  however,  the  smallest  and  largest  banks  exhibit  the  highest  lending  share.  Total 
lending to non-banks comprises of small business lending (43.3% of total lending to non-
banks or 26.4% of total assets) and lending to retail, and to a lesser extent public and foreign 
customers. Small business lending increases monotonically with bank size in absolute terms 
as well as relative to total assets or relative to total lending to non-banks suggesting that larger 
banks engage more heavily in small business lending than small banks, presumably because 
of lending restrictions at small banks. In turn, possibly because of lending restrictions, the 
smallest banks seem to engage more heavily in lending to retail customers implied by their 
share of total lending to non-banks being higher than the respective average share of any other 
size class while their small business lending share being the lowest. The loans to the smallest 
of the small business borrowers (“Handwerk”), a part of small business lending, make up 
4.5% of total assets and 7.6% of total lending to non-banks. While lending to this sub-group 
of small business borrowers increases monotonically in absolute terms its relative share to 
both total assets and total lending to non-banks decreases with size (except for the quartile of 
smallest  savings  banks,  which  exhibits  a  low  share  of  lending  to  the  smallest  borrowers 
presumably again due to lending restrictions). The decline in the relative share of lending to 
the “Handwerk” may be explained by the fact that each market only hosts a given number of 
this kind of firms and demand is expected to slow once the funding needs of all of them are 
satisfied. 
Table 4 depicts the M&A activity among German savings banks. As shown in Panel A of 
Table 4, the number of savings banks in Germany declined from 607 at the end of 1996 to   20 
457 at the end of 2006. This reduction in the number of German savings banks was solely 
subject to mergers among savings banks, although some of the mergers were actually pursued 
as a preemptive distress resolution (see Elsas (2004) and Koetter et al. (2005)). The number of 
savings banks dissolved through M&A is not equal to the M&A activity among savings banks 
because some M&A transactions involve more than two savings banks, also some savings 
banks were involved in more than one transaction in any one year which we do not account 
for in our analysis. Panel B presents a break down of how many savings banks have been 
involved in M&A once or multiple times. Out of a total of 457 savings banks 341 banks have 
not been involved in M&A during the observation period, 92 banks have been involved once 
while 24 banks have been involved several times. 
5.  Empirical results and discussion 
Below we test whether mergers among German savings banks affect the extent to which these 
banks lend to small business borrowers post-merger. First, we compare differences in means 
of  lending  volumes  and  lending  shares  of  total  assets  between  merging  and  non-merging 
banks in the years respectively following bank mergers. Second, we estimate the dynamic 
adjustment  process  of  bank  lending  volumes  in  response  to  mergers  using  the  General 
Methods of Moments dynamic panel data estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). 
Various robustness tests highlight the robustness of our findings. 
Differences in means 
As a first analysis of the impact of bank mergers on small business lending we compare the 
average development of merging banks’ lending activities in the merger year and up to four 
years  thereafter  with  the  simultaneous  average  lending  behavior  of  the  341  banks  in  our 
sample that have not been involved in M&A.18 For the purpose of comparing merging with 
non-merging  banks’  lending  performance  we  do  not  use  a  matched  sample  because 
differences in the extent to which savings banks engage in lending are not solely driven by 
size but most importantly by the banks’ economic environment and the individual bank’s 
credit and risk strategy. Furthermore, the number of available savings banks not involved in 
                                                       
18  The  number  of  observations  decreases  over  the  post-merger  horizon because  the  longer-term  post-merger  effects  of 
mergers conducted in the last years of our observation period (e.g. in 2005) cannot yet be observed. Furthermore, we 
exclude banks involved in M&A more than once to avoid the interference of effects associated with different mergers. 
The figures for the control group always present the mean for all 341 banks not involved in mergers throughout the 
observation period.   21 
mergers limits the possibility to match merging and non-merging banks according to a more 
refined set of characteristics such as a combination of size, profitability and local economic 
environment. As metrics of banks’ lending activities we use total lending to non-banks, small 
business lending and in order to capture the smallest of the small business borrowers we also 
use lending to “Handwerk”. All three metrics are measured both in absolute terms and as their 
respective  percentage  share  of  total  bank  assets.  Small  business  lending  and  lending  to 
“Handwerk”, a sub-category of small business lending, are also measured as percentage of 
total lending to non-banks. Besides these three metrics for bank’s lending activities we also 
observe the post-merger development of the combined bank’s size measured in terms of total 
assets. Thereby we intend to observe whether changes to the absolute level of lending is a 
result of changes specific to lending or a consequence of bank wide restructuring. 
For our comparison we use an index with the pre-merger year as base year to analyze average 
post-merger development in order to ensure that the effects at all banks are equally weighted 
and that the differences between merging and non-merging banks are not size-driven. This 
methodology yields the same results as a comparison of growth rates between lending levels 
pre-merger and in respective post-merger years, an analysis conducted by a number of other 
studies  (e.g.  Strahan  and  Weston  (1998)).  We  also  adjust  absolute  lending  volumes  for 
inflation. A t-test confirms whether differences in lending performance between merging and 
non-merging banks are statistically significant. 
Our analysis suggests that merging banks grow at a lower rate than non-merging banks. As 
shown in Table 5, the merger induced differences in bank size persist not only in the year of 
the merger but for all four years observed following the merger and they are significant at the 
5%  and  1%  levels,  respectively.  One  alternative  reason  for  this  result  may  be  that  non-
merging banks grow at a higher rate than merging (typically) larger banks, an explanation for 
which we control in a robustness check as part of our dynamic regression analysis below. 
Compared  to  the  simultaneous  development  of  non-merging  banks  merging  banks’  total 
lending to non-banks in absolute terms does not perform significantly different in the merger 
year and the first post-merger year. The growth in total lending to non-banks of merging 
banks slows in the second, third and fourth year after the merger compared to non-merging 
banks. In the fourth year following a bank merger non-merging banks exhibit approximately 
7% higher lending volumes than merging banks. The differences between merging and non-
merging banks’ total lending volumes are statistically significant at the 1% level in the years 2   22 
to 4 following the merger. The emergence of merger related effects in the second post-merger 
year suggests that merger related effects on lending seem to only kick in after some time. This 
result is in line with Focarelli et al. (2002) who show that the merger related effect on loans to 
small firms emerge between the first and the third year following mergers and even only 
thereafter in the case of acquisitions. If we measure total lending to non-banks as a percentage 
of total assets we do not observe statistically significant differences between merging and 
non-merging years in any post-merger year. Above results suggest that banks reduce their 
lending exposure in absolute terms, however, other assets seem to be reduced proportionally 
as indicated by the significant negative development of total assets post-merger as well as the 
constant percentage share of total lending to non-banks to total assets. 
For our three measures for small business lending we find consistent results. In terms of the 
absolute level of small business lending all savings banks develop similarly in the merger year 
and  the  first  subsequent  year.  However,  thereafter  merging  banks  decrease  their  small 
business lending faster than non-merging banks. The difference between merging and non-
merging banks is significant at the 5% level. In terms of the timing of the merger related 
effects their emergence after the first post-merger year again confirm that changes to lending 
occur only over time. The overall decline in absolute small business lending is probably not 
merger  related  but  subject  to  the  overall  trend  in  the  savings  banks  sector  of  decreasing 
lending to small business borrowers as exhibited in Panel A of Table 2. If we measure small 
business lending as a percentage of total assets or as percentage of total lending to non-banks 
merging banks do not perform statistically different from their non-merging peers. Although 
merging banks reduce their small business lending in absolute terms this reduction does not 
seem to be driven by factors specific to small business lending but rather, similar to total 
lending to non-banks, by restructuring measures affecting the overall institution. 
In  terms  of  small  business  lending  to  “Handwerk”  we  do  not  find  that  its  post-merger 
development is significantly different between merging and non-merging banks. This finding 
holds for all measures observed for small business lending to “Handwerk”. Our analysis of 
differences in means suggests that mergers do not impact banks’ extent to which they lend to 
this group of small business borrowers. This finding is somehow contrary to our descriptive 
analysis which finds a decreasing share of small business lending to both total assets and total 
lending to non-banks with increasing size. Our dynamic regression analysis below will shed 
more light on the impact of mergers on lending to “Handwerk” while controlling for other   23 
potential determinants of the extent to which banks engage in this type of lending. Similar to 
small business lending in general lending to “Handwerk” declines over time consistent with 
the industry-wide trend of a decline in lending in this field as exhibited in Panel A of Table 2. 
Regression analysis 
In the following we test whether bank mergers affect the extent to which merging banks lend 
to small business borrowers using multivariate regression analysis for dynamic panel data. 
Thereby,  we  estimate  the  empirical  model  we  introduced  above.  Including  lags  of  the 
dependent variable on the right side, specifically accounts for the fact that adjustments to 
merger induced shocks on small business lending do not materialize immediately but over 
time. Technically, we employ the General Methods of Moments dynamic panel data estimator 
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) because results from ordinary least squares (OLS) and 
fixed-effects  estimations  lead  to  results  that  are  inconsistent.  Bond  (2002)  discusses 
econometric techniques available for dynamic panel data models extensively and proves both 
theoretically and empirically that results from OLS or fixed-effects are likely to be biased for 
panels with a large number of cross-sections and a small number of time periods, the same 
characteristics that apply for our data set. 19 
We  apply  the  one-step  GMM  estimator  with  robust  standard  errors  for  inference  on 
coefficients as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), however, we find that the two-step 
estimator also leads to consistent results. For GMM coefficient estimates to be consistent the 
differenced error terms may not be serially correlated and the specified instruments must be 
valid.  Hence,  for  each  regression  we  test  the  null  hypotheses  of  a)  no  second  order 
autocorrelation using the respective test proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and b) of no 
correlation between instrumental variables and residuals using the Sargan test based on the 
two-step GMM estimator which, as suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991), is better suited 
for testing model specifications because the Sargan test over-rejects in the one-step setting. 
Consistency  of  our  model  and  resulting  findings  is  only  provided  if  we  fail  to  reject  the 
aforementioned tests. Because in some specifications these tests are rejected we include four 
lags of the respective dependent variable. The additional lags of our dependent variable are 
included solely for econometrical reasons, namely to ensure consistency of both instruments 
                                                       
19  Bond (2002) shows that results from alternative estimation techniques are inconsistent because of the correlation of the 
lagged explanatory variable with the error term due to the presence of fixed effects and the correlation between first-
differenced lagged dependent variables and first-differenced error terms, respectively.   24 
and coefficient estimates, hence, we do not report or interpret their coefficient estimates (e.g. 
see Drobetz et al. (2006)).20 
We  analyze  the  effects  of  bank  mergers  on  small  business  lending  by  estimating  the 
determinants  of  our  three  measures  of  banks’  small  business  lending,  namely  Ln(Small 
Business Lending), Small Business Lending as % of Total Assets and Small Business Lending 
as % of Total Lending to Non-banks. Coefficient estimates and p-values of the determinants 
of our small business lending metrics are reported in Table 6. Table 7 presents the results for 
small business lending to “Handwerk” using a similar estimation setup in a robustness check 
(in Panel C of Table 7 we show lending to “Handwerk” as percentage of small business 
lending instead of total lending to non-banks). In our base model we observe each bank six 
times  for  every  year  between  2001  and  2006.  Regressions  do  not  include  observations 
available for the years 1996 to 2000 as five time series observations are lost per bank: one due 
to  first  differencing  as  suggested  by  Arellano  and  Bond  (1991)  and  four  due  to  the 
aforementioned inclusion of four lags of the respective dependent variable. 
Our key explanatory variables are the M&A dummy variables that control for the lending 
impact of the observed banks’ merger involvement in either the observed year (t = t), in each 
of the four previous years (t = t - 1; t = t - 2; t = t - 3; t = t - 4) or any year before that (t < t - 
4).21 The results in Column (1) of Panel A of Table 6 show that merger involvement does not 
affect the total volume of small business loans lent to small borrowers in the merger year or in 
subsequent year. The coefficient estimates for all M&A dummy variables are not significantly 
different from zero. The result of no impact from M&A in the merger year and the immediate 
years thereafter is in line with expectations as most previous studies such as Bonaccorsi di 
Patti and Gobbi (2007) and Focarelli et al. (2002) find that potential merger induced changes 
to  small  business  lending  become  visible  only  after  a  number  of  years  as  restructuring 
measures take time to be implemented and realized. Nevertheless, even after allowing for 
                                                       
20  Generally, at least the first two lags of our dependent variable are positive and statistically significant while the third and 
fourth lag vary in direction depending on the measure for small business lending but are not statistically significant. 
21  As a robustness test we re-run all regression using a M&A dummy variable structure that distinguishes between short, 
medium and long term effects as suggested by Focarelli et al. (2002) and Elsas (2004). Thereby, we include one dummy 
variable that reflects whether a merger took place in the year currently observed (t = t). Medium-term effects are captured 
by a M&A dummy variable that indicates whether the respective bank was involved in a merger during the last one to 
three years (t  Î [t – 1; t – 3]). Long-term effects are accounted for using a dummy variable that reflects whether the 
respective bank participated in a merger in any year more than three years ago (t = t  £ - 4). Nevertheless, this alternative 
specification leads to consistent results.   25 
some time for changes to materialize we do not find any evidence of merger related changes 
to small business lending, neither positive nor negative. 
In Columns (2) and (3) of Panel A of Table 6 we explicitly control for the state of the local 
market environment in terms of its strength and its position in the economic cycle as well as 
the local loan demand by including GDP per inhabitant and the average risk-adjusted yield on 
small business loans in the market, respectively. In the absence of alternative data, the latter is 
based on the average SME loan interest rate charged by the respective savings bank adjusted 
for  both  risk  and  the  current  interest  rate  level.  We  add  the  two  aforementioned  control 
variables for the local market environment separately in two separate model specifications as 
limited data availability for these two variables reduces the time-series observations available 
for each bank and, hence, results in loss of information. In these two model specifications 
coefficient estimates for all M&A variables are not significantly different from zero which 
underlines the robustness of our finding of no negative (or positive) impact of mergers among 
German savings banks on small business lending volumes. Panel B and Panel C of Table 6 
present estimation results for our two alternative measures of small business lending which 
provide broadly the same results. The results for small business lending to “Handwerk” as 
presented in Table 7 are broadly in line with the findings for overall small business lending. 
For  Ln(Small  Business  Lending  to  “Handwerk”)  as  dependent  variable  M&A  dummy 
variables are negative and statistically significant. However, we cannot interpret the estimates 
as a proof for a negative influence from mergers on small business lending to “Handwerk” 
because the choice of instruments in this particular setting is not valid as shown by the Sargan 
test. 
In each regression we control for a number of individual bank characteristics, the local market 
environment and the capital markets environment. Except for the bank-specific controls for 
size (Total Assets and Ln(Total Assets)), generally, controls have limited explanatory power 
because the lagged dependent variables incorporate all determinants of the previous years’ 
lending propensity and, hence, the other explanatory variables only pose innovations (Greene 
(2003)). Because one might argue that bank-specific variables are not likely to be strictly 
exogenous  and  that  merger  induced  shocks  may  also  impact  some  of  the  explanatory 
variables, in robustness tests that are not reported for conciseness reasons, we include bank-
specific variables at the second lag as instruments to control for endogeneity. Results are 
consistent to those presented here.   26 
In our estimations of the determinants of Ln(Small Business Lending) and Small Business 
Lending as % of Total Lending to Non-banks the coefficient for Total Assets is positive and 
statistically  significant,  while  Sq(Total  Assets)  is  negative  and  in  almost  all  cases  also 
significant. Hence, small business lending volumes initially increase monotonically but at a 
slowing rate with bank size and decline following a certain size threshold. This is contrary to 
Strahan and Weston (1998) and our descriptive analysis both of which show that absolute 
small  business  lending  volumes  increase  monotonically  with  bank  size.  Nevertheless, 
considering the economic impact the change in size must be very large to significantly alter a 
bank’s  small  business  lending  volumes.  For  example,  Total  Assets  and  Ln(Total  Assets) 
coefficients in Column (1) of Panel A of Table 6 suggest that an increase in total assets by one 
billion (i.e. 50% asset growth for the average savings bank) would result in an expansion in 
small business lending of approximately 6.6%. For Small Business Lending as % of Total 
Assets (Panel B of Table 6) the coefficients for Total Assets and Sq(Total Assets) are negative 
and positive, respectively, and both statistically significant at the 5% level. These findings 
suggest  that  the  relative  share  of  total  assets  allocated  to  small  business  lending  initially 
decreases  with  bank  size  but  stabilizes  and  reverts  beyond  a  certain  size  threshold. 
Interestingly,  this  result  is  also  contrary  to  findings  by  Strahan  and  Weston  (1998)  and 
DeYoung (1998) who find that small business lending as a percentage of total assets first 
increases up to a certain threshold but decreases thereafter with bank size. 
Small business lending measured both in absolute and in relative terms is negatively related to 
the Yield Curve Slope indicating that the wider the spread between long-term and short-term 
market interest rates the more companies lend at the short end or, alternatively, banks reduce 
the  extent  to  which  they  pursue  term  transformation.  Finally,  small  business  lending  is 
negatively related to GDP and positively to the average local loan yields. The latter indicates 
that  banks  in  markets  with  high  loan  demand  can  attract  more  lending  business  in  both 
absolute and relative terms. 
In robustness tests that are not reported for conciseness reasons we also test whether the 
impact of bank mergers on small business lending differs dependent on whether the respective 
bank is located in an urban or in a rural area or whether the bank is situated in an Eastern or a 
Western German state. While we do not observe differences between banks in rural and urban 
areas we find for the sub-sample of East German banks that mergers are followed by an 
expansion  in  small  business  lending  in  absolute  terms  –  both  relative  measures  of  small   27 
business  lending  do  not  indicate  merger  related  effects.  Results  for  Ln(Small  Business 
Lending) are valid and significant at the 5% level for all M&A dummy variables. For West 
German  savings  banks  we  find  that  mergers  negatively  affect  the  extent  to  which  saving 
banks lend to small business borrowers, however, results hold only for small business lending 
in absolute terms and are not valid because we reject the Sargan test of no overidentifying 
restrictions. In a further robustness test we include total assets growth in order to control for 
the possibility that merging (larger) banks grow at a lower rate than non-merging banks as 
suggested by our differences in means analysis. We find results consistent with our main 
finding of no merger related effect on small business lending from mergers among savings 
banks in Germany. 
In their studies on the causes and consequences of bank mergers in Germany Elsas (2004) and 
Koetter et al. (2005) highlight that a non-negligible share of mergers among savings banks 
and cooperative banks are in fact preemptive moves to resolve distress. In order to rule out 
that results are driven by post-merger adjustments to banks’ small business lending that are 
different for potentially distressed and healthy banks we control for the likelihood of a merger 
being motivated by imminent distress. Because we do not know for sure which mergers were 
initiated as a preemptive distress resolution we define an interaction term as the product of the 
M&A dummy variable  and the relative frequency  of distress  among savings banks in the 
respective  year  of  the  merger.  Estimation  results  show  that  the  impact  of  bank  mergers 
conducted  in  years  of  increased  distress  frequency  lead  to  a  reduction  in  small  business 
lending in absolute terms by approximately 5%. However, we are not able to find comparable 
results for Small Business Lending as % of Total Assets or Small Business Lending as % of 
Total Lending to Non-banks. We suggest that banks that merge with distressed peers reduce 
not only the respective bank’s loan portfolio but its overall balance sheet as already suggested 
by our differences in means analysis. 
Finally, we distinguish mergers by the relative size differences between participating banks. 
Thereby we account for whether two banks of equal size merge or whether a larger (measured 
as being 25% larger in terms of total assets) bank merges with a smaller bank. Contrary to 
previous studies we do not find any significant merger related effects and infer that savings 
banks mergers do not affect small business lending irrespective of the size difference between 
merging parties. Following Peek and Rosengren (1998) we also exclude all transactions where   28 
one merger partner is smaller than 20% of the total asset size of the other participating bank. 
Still we arrive at consistent results of no merger related effects on small business lending. 
6.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate the impact of mergers among German savings banks on the 
extent to which these savings banks engage in small business lending. Based on dynamic 
panel regression analyses we find robust evidence that German savings banks mergers do not 
negatively (or positively) affect the credit availability to small business borrowers. Merging 
savings banks continue to lend to small businesses to the same extent compared to before the 
merger or to other non-merging savings banks. Thereby they do not only provide the same 
absolute amount of credit but also allocate the same share of their assets or the same share of 
their total funds attributed to lending to non-banks to lending to small businesses. Results also 
hold for the most bank-dependent of the small business borrowers, the German “Handwerk”. 
Our results are robust across model specifications and do not show any significant impact 
from savings banks mergers on small business lending whatsoever. Our findings are in line 
with the results of the only other study on the merger related effects on small business lending 
in the German market by Marsch et al. (2007). In their study, the authors take a firm-level 
view  and  find  that  banking  consolidation  in  Germany  has,  if  at  all,  only  a  very  limited 
negative effect on the financing of small and medium sized businesses in Germany. Hence, 
our findings as well as those brought forward by Marsch et al. (2007) mitigate any concerns 
about a merger induced decline in the credit availability to Germany’s small and medium 
sized businesses. We argue that savings banks continue to focus on small business lending as 
part  of  their  public  mandate  of  providing  financial  services  to  individuals  and  small  and 
medium sized companies in their respective business districts to promote economic growth 
and stability. Furthermore, we propose that the regional principle and the fact that merged 
savings banks remain still comparatively small in size limit the extent to which they can 
engage in other businesses or allocate resources away from small business lending. However, 
it remains unclear und subject to further research at what consolidation stage merger related 
effects might actually turn out to be negative because savings banks become too large to 
maintain their advantage in small business lending. 
With this paper we are the first to investigate merger related effects on small business lending 
from a bank-level perspective in Germany. Although this subject has been extensively studied   29 
for the US it has generally received only limited attention for other markets. Furthermore, for 
the purposes of this study we are able to draw on a unique proprietary panel data set provided 
by  the  German  Savings  Banks  Association.  Compared  to  other  data  sources  for  bank 
financials  this  data  set  is  superior  in  terms  of  the  completeness  and  the  level  of  detail, 
especially with regards to the detailed breakdown of each bank’s lending activities otherwise 
not available in statutory accounts. Finally, we contribute to the existing empirical research by 
being the first in this context to specify a dynamic framework that simultaneously estimates 
the extent to which banks engage in small business lending and its adjustment behavior using 
recent General Method of Moments (GMM) techniques developed for dynamic panel data 
analyses by Arellano and Bond (1991).   30 
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Table 1: Description of variables 
Variable    Unit  Description 
    Dependent variables   
Ln(Small Business Lending)  EUR 
million 
Natural logarithm of total loans to SME customers. 
Small Business Lending as % 
of Total Assets 
%  Total loans to SME customers divided by the bank’s average total assets. 
Calculation:  Total loans to SME customers / total assets * 100 
Small Business Lending as % 
of Total Lending to Non-
banks 
%  Total loans to SME customers divided by the bank’s average lending to non-banks. 
Calculation:  Total loans to SME customers / total lending to non-banks * 100 
Note: For Small Business Lending to “Handwerk”, as alternative dependent variable we apply the same measures as stated above. 
    Explanatory variables   
M&A activity   
M&A  dummy 
variable 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respective bank has been involved in mergers and acquisitions in the 
respective year. 
    Bank characteristics   
Total Assets  EUR 
billion 
Bank’s average total assets. 
Sq(Total Assets)  EUR 
billion 
Square of bank’s average total assets. 
Average Loan Size  EUR 
million 
Average loan size of loans to SME customers. 
Calculation:  Total loans to SME customers / total number of loans to SME customers 
Non-Interest Revenues / 
Operating Revenues 
%  Percentage share of non-interest revenues of bank’s total operating revenues comprising of net interest 
revenues and non-interest revenues (i.e. fee, commission and other revenues) before deduction of any 
operating expenses. 
Calculation:  Non-interest revenues/ (net interest revenues + non-interest revenues) * 100 
Loan Loss Provisions / Total 
Lending 
%  Percentage share of bank’s loan loss provisions to bank’s average total loans. 
Calculation:  Loan loss provisions / total loans * 100 
Equity / Total Assets  %  Percentage share of average total shareholders’ equity of bank’s average total assets. 
Calculation:  Equity / total assets * 100 
    Local market environment 
Local HHI  #  Hirschmann-Herfindahl-Index of market shares used to estimate market concentration and competition. 
Since total assets for all German banks are not available on a district level, we approximate the market 
share with the share of branches (compare Fischer and Hempell (2006)). 
Calculation:  ∑
=
n
1 j
2
j) ms ( * 100;  
n=number of banks in local market, msj=market share (in terms of branches) of j
th bank 
Local Yield on Small 
Business Lending 
%  Average loan interest rate for small business loans in local market adjusted for credit risk and current 
interest rate level. Calculated based on data available for respective local savings bank. 
Calculation:  (Interest income from total loans to SME customers - loan loss provisions) / 
    total loans to SME customer) – 1-year interest rate 
Local GDP per Inhabitant  EUR thsd.  Gross Domestic Product (GDP) divided by the number of inhabitants per administrative district. 
    Capital markets environment   
Yield Curve Slope  %  Difference in yields between short- (1-month) and long-term (10-year) maturities. 
Calculation:  10-year government bond rate – 1-month EURIBOR rate 
Note: Assets and liabilities represent average monthly balance sheet data for the respective year. Profit and loss items are as of the end of the respective 
year.   35 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics – Bank and market characteristics 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the sample of 457 public savings banks in Germany that existed at the end of 2006. Financials are pro forma adjusted for mergers by fully consolidating merging banks not only in the 
years following the merger but in all years of the observation period. Panel A presents the means of individual bank and market characteristics for each year for the period 1996 to 2006. Panel B presents the means and 25% and 
75% percentiles for each variable and for the full sample applied in our regression analyses for the years 2001 to 2006 (observation period as per our regression analyses). Absolute values in EUR are presented at 2000 prices to 
adjust for inflationary effects. The Compounded Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) in Panel A is presented for the period 1996 to 2006. 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for full sample of 457 savings banks by year
Variables Unit 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 CAGR
Bank characteristics (mean)
Total Assets EUR million 1,768 1,843 1,923 2,003 2,038 2,052 2,079 2,073 2,055 2,035 2,025 1.4%
Small Business Lending EUR million 526 540 564 578 602 611 606 590 573 556 550 0.4%
as % of Total Assets % 28.2% 28.1% 28.1% 27.3% 27.9% 28.0% 27.1% 26.5% 26.0% 25.5% 25.4% N/A
as % of Total Lending to Non-banks % 46.3% 45.5% 45.6% 44.8% 45.3% 45.3% 44.5% 43.3% 42.7% 42.2% 42.1% N/A
Small Business Lending to "Handwerk" EUR million 93 93 96 96 98 96 93 87 80 78 75 -2.1%
as % of Total Assets % 5.5% 5.4% 5.3% 5.2% 5.2% 5.1% 4.9% 4.5% 4.2% 4.2% 4.1% N/A
as % of Total Lending to Non-banks % 9.4% 9.0% 8.9% 8.7% 8.7% 8.5% 8.2% 7.6% 7.1% 7.1% 6.9% N/A
Average Loan Size EUR 96,524 98,499 93,847 93,282 94,448 94,068 96,858 94,760 94,565 94,842 92,032 -0.5%
Non-Interest Revenues / Operating Revenues % 15.2% 16.0% 17.4% 18.9% 20.5% 19.4% 18.5% 19.3% 20.4% 20.8% 21.9% N/A
Loan Loss Provisions / Total Lending % 0.8% 0.7% 0.6% 0.2% 0.5% 0.6% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.6% 0.4% N/A
Equity / Total Assets % 4.0% 4.1% 4.2% 4.2% 4.4% 4.4% 4.4% 4.5% 4.7% 4.9% 5.0% N/A
Local market environment (mean)
Local HHI # 1,802 1,694 1,686 1,657 1,642 1,669 1,711 1,658 1,658 1,658 1,658 N/A
Local Yield on Small Business Lending % N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.8% 0.8% 1.6% 1.5% 1.7% 1.0% N/A
Local GDP per Inhabitant EUR 22,078 22,514 23,112 23,629 24,205 24,685 25,003 25,202 25,877 N/A N/A N/A
Capital markets environment (mean)
Yield Curve Slope % 2.9% 2.5% 1.1% 1.6% 1.1% 0.4% 1.5% 1.7% 2.0% 1.2% 0.8% N/A
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for full sample of 457 savings banks
Variables Unit 25% Mean 75%
Bank characteristics
Total Assets EUR million 686 2,053 2,377
Small Business Lending EUR million 163 581 666
as % of Total Assets % 21.4% 26.4% 31.3%
as % of Total Lending to Non-banks % 38.3% 43.3% 48.5%
Small Business Lending to "Handwerk" EUR million 28 85 102
as % of Total Assets % 3.0% 4.5% 5.6%
as % of Total Lending to Non-banks % 5.2% 7.6% 9.6%
Average Loan Size EUR 75,996 94,521 106,047
Non-Interest Revenues / Operating Revenues % 18.0% 20.0% 22.0%
Loan Loss Provisions / Total Lending % 0.3% 0.7% 0.9%
Equity / Total Assets % 4.0% 4.6% 5.2%
Local market environment
Local HHI # 1,264 1,668 2,024
Local Yield on Small Business Lending % 0.7% 1.2% 2.2%
Local GDP per Inhabitant EUR 19,511 25,192 27,666
Capital markets environment
Yield Curve Slope % 0.8% 1.3% 1.7%
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics – Banks’ lending activities by bank size 
This table presents descriptive statistics on banks’ lending activities for the sample of 457 public savings banks in Germany that existed at the end of 
2006. Financials are pro forma adjusted for mergers by fully consolidating merging banks not only in the years following the merger but in all years of the 
observation period. The table presents the means for each variable for the years 2001 to 2006 (observation period as per our regression analyses) by size 
quartile based on bank’s total assets as well as for the full sample. Absolute values in EUR are presented at 2000 prices to adjust for inflationary effects. 
Full sample
Variables Unit (1) (2) (3) (4) Mean
Total Assets EUR million 406 877 1,528 4,762 2,053
Total Lending to Non-banks EUR million 248 515 929 2,951 1,260
as % of Total Assets % 62.5% 58.6% 60.6% 61.7% 60.8%
Small Business Lending EUR million 101 223 404 1,405 581
as % of Total Assets % 24.9% 25.3% 26.4% 28.5% 26.4%
as % of Total Lending to Non-banks % 39.7% 43.0% 43.6% 46.1% 43.3%
Small Business Lending to "Handwerk" EUR million 18 42 72 183 85
as % of Total Assets % 4.3% 4.7% 4.7% 4.2% 4.5%
as % of Total Lending to Non-banks % 7.1% 8.3% 8.0% 6.8% 7.6%
Size quartiles based on total assets (mean)
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics – M&A activity among German savings banks 
This table presents descriptive statistics of the merger activity of the 457 German public savings banks included in our sample for the years 1996 to 2006. Panel A presents the number of savings banks at the end of each year, the 
number of savings banks dissolved through M&A in each year and the number of savings banks involved in M&A in every year during the observation period. The latter is presented for the whole of Germany as well as for West 
and East Germany separately. The number of savings banks dissolved through M&A does not equal the M&A activity among savings banks because some M&A transactions involve more than two savings banks, also the number 
of M&A transactions of the individual bank in any one year is not taken into account. Panel B presents a breakdown of the number of saving banks involved in M&A by the frequency of their involvement. The sum of savings 
banks involved in M&A in each year during the observation period is 147 which is greater than the total number of savings banks involved in M&A during the observation period of 116 due to repeated M&A activity by 24 of the 
116 merging savings banks. 
Panel A: Development of number of savings banks and M&A activity among savings banks by year
Total 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Savings banks N/A 607 598 594 578 562 537 519 489 477 463 457
Savings banks dissolved through M&A 167 17 9 4 16 16 25 18 30 12 14 6
M&A activity per year 147 13 8 4 12 14 21 17 27 11 14 6
M&A activity per year - West Germany 123 6 6 4 10 14 21 17 23 6 10 6
M&A activity per year - East Germany 24 7 2 0 2 0 0 0 4 5 4 0
Panel B: Number of savings banks involved in M&A by activity between 1996 and 2006
Total
Savings banks involved in M&A in at least 1 year 116
Savings banks not involved in M&A during observation period 341
Savings banks involved in M&A in 1 year 92
Savings banks involved in M&A in more than 1 year 24
Savings banks involved in M&A in 2 years 19
Savings banks involved in M&A in 3 years 3
Savings banks involved in M&A in 4 years 2
Savings banks involved in M&A in 5 years 0
Savings banks involved in M&A in 6 years 0
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Table 5: Differences in means – Post-merger development of banks’ lending activities 
This table presents results for t-tests of differences in means for the simultaneous development of Total Assets, Total Lending to Non-banks, Small 
Business Lending and Small Business Lending to “Handwerk” (measured in absolute terms, as percentage of total assets and as percentage of total 
lending to non-banks) of merging banks and 341 savings banks not involved in mergers during the observation period from 1996 and 2006. We do not 
include all 92 savings banks involved in M&A once during the observation period to ensure a more balanced sample for each post-merger year observed. 
The number of observations (n) refers to the number of merging banks included in the analysis. The number of observations of merging banks decreases 
over time as a performance history of up to 4 years is not yet able for most recent mergers. Savings banks repeatedly involved in M&A are not included in 
order to avoid interfering effects from repeated M&A in the post-merger period of the first merger. We use an index with the year prior to the merger (t = 
-1) as base year to ensure that savings banks of different sizes are equally weighted. Performance is reported for the merger year (t = 0) and respective 
years after the merger (t = +1, t = +2, t = +3, t = +4). 
Variables t = -1 t = 0 t = +1 t = +2 t = +3 t = +4
(n = 59) (n = 67) (n = 65) (n = 62) (n = 49) (n = 39)
Total Assets
Merging banks 100 100 100 99 99 99
Non-merging banks (control group) 100 100 101 102 105 106
Difference 0 -1** -2*** -3*** -5*** -7***
Total Lending to Non-banks
Merging banks 100 103 102 99 99 98
Non-merging banks (control group) 100 101 101 101 104 105
Difference 0 2 1 -3*** -5*** -7***
Total Lending to Non-banks as % of Total Assets
Merging banks 100 103 103 100 100 99
Non-merging banks (control group) 100 100 100 99 99 99
Difference 0 3 3  0  0  0
Small Business Lending
Merging banks 100 102 100 95 96 96
Non-merging banks (control group) 100 100 99 98 101 101
Difference 0 2 1  -3** -5** -5**
Small Business Lending as % of Total Assets
Merging banks 100 102 101 96 97 97
Non-merging banks (control group) 100 99 98 96 95 94
Difference 0 3 3  0  1 2
Small Business Lending as % of Total Lending to Non-banks
Merging banks 100 99 98 96 97 97
Non-merging banks (control group) 100 99 98 96 96 95
Difference 0 0 0  0  1 2**
Small Business Lending to "Handwerk"
Merging banks 100 100 94 87 86 83
Non-merging banks (control group) 100 95 89 85 81 78
Difference 0 5 4  2 4 5
Small Business Lending to "Handwerk" as % of Total Assets
Merging banks 100 100 94 88 86 84
Non-merging banks (control group) 100 97 92 89 86 84
Difference 0 4 2  -1  0 0
Small Business Lending to "Handwerk" as % of Total Lending to Non-banks
Merging banks 100 97 91 88 86 84
Non-merging banks (control group) 100 96 92 89 86 84
Difference 0 0 -1  -1  0 0
***significant at 0 to 1 percent level, **significant at 1 to 5 percent level, *significant at 5 to 10 percent level, others: significant at above 10 percent level
Post-merger development
(index based on pre-merger year (t = -1); merger in t = 0)
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Table 6: The effects of bank mergers on small business lending 
This table presents coefficient estimates and p-values (reported in brackets) from dynamic panel regressions relating M&A activity to the extent to which 
banks engage in small business lending. Dependent variables are banks’ loans to small business borrowers measured as Ln(Small Business Lending) 
(Panel A), Small Business Lending as % of Total Assets (Panel B) and Small Business Lending as % of Total Lending to Non-banks (Panel C). All 
regressions are applied to the full sample using detailed financials of 457 German savings banks for the period 2001 to 2006. Regressions do not account 
for data available for the years 1996 to 2000 due to the inclusion of up to four lags of the respective dependent variable (not reported) as well as first 
differencing as per Arellano and Bond (1991). Further variations in sample size are due to potential data limitations. As estimation technique, we use the 
General Methods of Moments (GMM) dynamic panel data estimator with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors proposed by Arellano and Bond 
(1991). All coefficients are based on the one-step estimator as recommended by Arellano and Bond (1991). The 2nd order autocorrelation test statistics 
test the null hypothesis of no second order correlation in the residuals as required for the consistency of the GMM estimator. The Sargan test statistics test 
the null hypothesis of valid overidentifying restrictions based on the Arellano and Bond (1991) two-step estimator. 
Panel B:
SBL as % of Total 
Assets
Panel C:
SBL as % of Lending 
to Non-banks
Variables (1) (2) (3) (1) (1)
M&A activity
M&A (τ = t) 0.014 0.020 0.021 0.267 0.179
[0.335] [0.269] [0.190] [0.511] [0.357]
M&A (τ = t - 1) 0.004 0.019 0.009 0.471** 0.268
[0.705] [0.288] [0.499] [0.032] [0.208]
M&A (τ = t - 2) -0.007 0.010 -0.005 0.075 -0.078
[0.557] [0.601] [0.708] [0.839] [0.755]
M&A (τ = t - 3) 0.001 0.006 0.005 0.370 0.282
[0.911] [0.754] [0.673] [0.271] [0.343]
M&A (τ = t - 4) -0.002 -0.007 -0.001 0.284 0.058
[0.839] [0.738] [0.924] [0.300] [0.832]
M&A (τ < t - 4) -0.013 -0.020 -0.007 0.393 0.147
[0.421] [0.388] [0.638] [0.259] [0.666]
Bank characteristics
Total Assets 0.066*** 0.056** 0.068*** -6.590** 0.711
[0.008] [0.041] [0.005] [0.012] [0.237]
Sq(Total Assets) -0.002** -0.001 -0.002** 0.129** -0.019
[0.021] [0.102] [0.014] [0.042] [0.176]
Average Loan Size 0.320 0.258 0.234 7.563 7.762
[0.225] [0.254] [0.220] [0.213] [0.152]
Non-Interest Revenues / Operating Revenues -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.023 -0.026
[0.541] [0.316] [0.697] [0.524] [0.496]
Loan Loss Provisions / Total Lending 0.013*** 0.009 -0.050 0.084 0.336***
[0.007] [0.150] [0.111] [0.473] [0.001]
Equity / Total Assets 0.007 0.003 0.006 0.557*** 0.159
[0.247] [0.674] [0.391] [0.000] [0.321]
Local market environment
Local HHI 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.326] [0.343] [0.489] [0.281] [0.862]
Local Yield on Small Business Lending -0.025*
[0.053]
Local GDP per Inhabitant -0.006***
[0.008]
Capital markets environment
Yield Curve Slope -0.018*** -0.023*** 0.006 -0.274*** -0.554***
[0.000] [0.006] [0.608] [0.002] [0.000]
Observations 2,728 1,815 2,270 2,728 2,728
Number of banks 457 457 457 457 457
2nd order autocorrelation test (p-value) 0.499 0.512 0.321 0.574 0.487
Sargan test (p-value) 0.225 0.136 0.130 0.111 0.111
***significant at 0 to 1 percent level, **significant at 1 to 5 percent level, *significant at 5 to 10 percent level, others: significant at above 10 percent level
Panel A:
Ln(Small Business Lending)
 
   40 
Table 7: The effects of bank mergers on small business lending to “Handwerk” 
This table presents coefficient estimates and p-values (reported in brackets) from dynamic panel regressions relating M&A activity to the extent to which 
banks engage in lending to the smallest of the small businesses, namely “Handwerk”. Dependent variables are banks’ loans to small business borrowers 
measured as Ln(Small Business Lending to “Handwerk”) (Panel A), Small Business Lending (SBL) to “Handwerk” as % of Total Assets (Panel B) and 
Small Business Lending (SBL) to “Handwerk” as % of Small Business Lending (Panel C). All regressions are applied to the full sample using detailed 
financials of 457 German savings banks for the period 2001 to 2006. Regressions do not account for data available for the years 1996 to 2000 due to the 
inclusion of up to four lags of the respective dependent variable (not reported) as well as first differencing as per Arellano and Bond (1991). Further 
variations in sample size are due to potential data limitations. As estimation technique, we use the General Methods of Moments (GMM) dynamic panel 
data estimator  with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). All coefficients are based on the one-step estimator 
as recommended by Arellano and Bond (1991). The 2nd order autocorrelation test statistics test the null hypothesis of no second order correlation in the 
residuals as required for the consistency of the GMM estimator. The Sargan test statistics test the null hypothesis of valid overidentifying restrictions 
based on the Arellano and Bond (1991) two-step estimator. 
Panel B:
SBL to "Handwerk" 
as % of Total Assets
Panel C:
SBL to "Handwerk" 
as % of Total SBL
Variables (1) (2) (3) (1) (1)
M&A activity
M&A (τ = t) 0.007 0.045* 0.012 0.059 -0.184
[0.723] [0.091] [0.616] [0.620] [0.566]
M&A (τ = t - 1) -0.033 0.020 -0.029 -0.021 -0.298
[0.130] [0.484] [0.257] [0.781] [0.272]
M&A (τ = t - 2) -0.060** 0.025 -0.061** -0.086 -0.471
[0.015] [0.400] [0.034] [0.423] [0.198]
M&A (τ = t - 3) -0.058** 0.017 -0.055* 0.014 -0.357
[0.030] [0.592] [0.066] [0.883] [0.385]
M&A (τ = t - 4) -0.088*** -0.011 -0.081** -0.012 -0.471
[0.008] [0.729] [0.023] [0.921] [0.338]
M&A (τ < t - 4) -0.132*** -0.004 -0.121** 0.121 0.016
[0.005] [0.923] [0.015] [0.421] [0.980]
Bank characteristics
Total Assets -0.018 0.010 -0.001 -1.232** -0.044
[0.684] [0.838] [0.979] [0.010] [0.936]
Sq(Total Assets) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.030** 0.015
[0.483] [0.356] [0.713] [0.011] [0.186]
Average Loan Size 0.098 0.140 0.075 0.723 -2.728
[0.495] [0.402] [0.576] [0.337] [0.267]
Non-Interest Revenues / Operating Revenues -0.002 0.003 -0.003 0.013 0.075
[0.484] [0.407] [0.399] [0.320] [0.217]
Loan Loss Provisions / Total Lending -0.009 -0.038 -0.086* 0.012 0.029
[0.743] [0.382] [0.086] [0.750] [0.851]
Equity / Total Assets 0.022 0.015 0.042 0.011 -0.102
[0.407] [0.671] [0.358] [0.861] [0.657]
Local market environment
Local HHI 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* -0.001
[0.349] [0.259] [0.431] [0.098] [0.275]
Local Yield on Small Business Lending -0.028
[0.115]
Local GDP per Inhabitant 0.002
[0.806]
Capital markets environment
Yield Curve Slope -0.046*** -0.030*** -0.017 -0.094** -0.309***
[0.000] [0.008] [0.344] [0.025] [0.006]
Observations 2,722 1,811 2,265 2,722 2,722
Number of banks 456 456 456 456 456
2nd order autocorrelation test (p-value) 0.180 0.339 0.698 0.775 0.758
Sargan test (p-value) 0.022** 0.408 0.010*** 0.077* 0.191
***significant at 0 to 1 percent level, **significant at 1 to 5 percent level, *significant at 5 to 10 percent level, others: significant at above 10 percent level
Panel A:
Ln(Small Business Lending to "Handwerk")
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